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Mathews v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 63 (Aug. 23, 2018)1
CRIMINAL APPEAL: EXPERT WITNESS REQUIREMENTS
Summary
The Court clarified the requirements for the introduction of an expert witness under NRS
50.275. Moreover, the Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it
improperly applied the Hallmark factors and disqualified Dr. Johnson from testifying.
Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant a new trial.
Background
On January 5, 2016, Donovine Mathews babysat his girlfriend’s two children. One of the
children, C.J., acquired burns atop his hands while under Mathews’ care that day. Mathews
claimed that he left C.J. unattended in a room along with a mug of boiling water that was placed
atop a table. When Mathews returned to the room, he claims to have found C.J. both burned and
screaming. He claims C.J. accidentally burned himself by knocking the mug off the table. The
State disagreed and contends that the burn was intentional.
To corroborate their contention, the State provided three medical experts to testify that the
burn injuries were intentional. Mathews attempted to have Dr. Lindsay “Dutch” Johnson, a
biomechanics expert, testify to rebut the State’s claims by naming the mechanism of the injury.
However, the district court granted the State’s motion to exclude or limit Dr. Johnson’s testimony.
The district court found that Dr. Johnson was not qualified to testify about burns on a child’s skin
and therefore, could not testify about how the injuries C.J. incurred. This appeal followed.
Discussion
The district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Johnson.
During an evidentiary hearing, the district court asked Dr. Johnson exclusively about his
experience with burn injuries. The court cut his testimony short and excluded him from testifying
within the trial. The court held that Dr. Johnson’s testimony did not have an adequate factual
foundation because no one else could identify how C.J. was burned. The court also held that Dr.
Johnson’s testimony lacked foundation because he was not qualified to testify about burns on a
child’s skin. Mathews appeals the decision on the basis that Dr. Johnson is a biomechanics expert
who could assist the jury in understanding the mechanism of C.J.’s injuries.
Per Hallmark v. Eldridge, an expert witness must satisfy three requirements before being
permitted to testify as an expert under NRS 50.275: "(1) he or she must be qualified in an area of
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge (the qualification requirement); (2) his or her
specialized knowledge must assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue (the assistance requirement); and (3) his or her testimony must be limited to matters
within the scope of [his or her specialized] knowledge.”2
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The district court did not allow Dr. Johnson to testify because he did not meet the
“qualification requirement” in that his experiences did not make him an expert on burn patterns.
This Court found that improper because the Dr. Johnson’s full list of licensure, academic degrees
and other experiences weren’t considered. Further, the district court wrongfully assessed the
“assistance requirement.” The district court wrongfully put the burden of proof on the defendant
to prove that he did not cause the burns. However, Mathews only needed to rebut the State’s
witness testimony and should have been allowed to do so through Dr. Johnson’s testimony. Thus,
the district court wrongfully presumed the State’s expert witness was correct and thereby, placed
the burden of proof on the defendant.3
Finally, the State has presently misinterpreted the Hallmark holding. It stated that expert
testimony, biomechanical or otherwise, must have a sufficient foundation before it may be
admitted into evidence.4 The State mistakenly thought the Hallmark holding indicated that
biomechanical experts are not permitted to testify. The Court held that the district court abused its
discretion because it improperly applied the Hallmark factors and subsequently disqualified Dr.
Johnson from testifying. Moreover, that error was not harmless and reversal is necessary.
The district court abused its discretion in rejecting Mathew’s proffered jury instruction.
The Court addressed the admissibility of Mathew’s jury instruction to avoid a similar issue
in the new trial. Mathews requested the following jury instruction:
A person who committed an act or made the omission charged, through misfortune
or accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention or culpable
negligence, must be found not guilty of the charge.
The Court held that the district court abused their discretion when it did not permit the admission
of the jury instruction because the instruction did not misstate the law. Defendants have the right
to instruct the jury on their case-related theory as disclosed by the evidence presented no matter
how weak that evidence may be.5 Further, Dr. Johnson may have presented evidence proving the
only ‘act’ Mathews engaged in was accidentally leaving a mug of hot water within C.J.’s reach.
Thus, excluding the jury instruction was not harmless.
Conclusion
The Court held that the district court wrongfully utilized their discretion when disqualifying Dr.
Johnson as an expert witness under NRS 50.275. Thus, the Court reversed the ruling of the district
court and remanded the case for a new trial.
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